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<blockquote data-quote="trainee4u" data-source="post: 211231" data-attributes="member: 30779"><p>While I probably wouldn't bring it up in interviews unsolicited, the Supreme Court's judgment in For Women Scotland is important for employment law and also for businesses providing services such as toilets, changing rooms, etc.</p><p></p><p>Here is the judgment </p><p>[URL unfurl="true"]https://supremecourt.uk/uploads/uksc_2024_0042_judgment_aea6c48cee.pdf[/URL]</p><p>which provides that references to sex in the Equality Act refer to biological sex. </p><p></p><p>Gender recognition certificates were introduced in 2004 following the ECtHR decision in Goodwin v UK. Goodwin complained of ECHR article 8 (private life) and 12 (right to marry) violations. At the time there were neither same-sex marriages nor civil partnerships in the UK. In addition, there was no right to change birth certificates and other official documentation to reflect a gender change</p><p></p><p>A gender recognition certificate has the effect of allowing one to change the sex on one's birth, death and marriage certificate. The GRA 2004 says that "for all purposes", a person's gender becomes the acquired gender. FWS were litigating whether this meant that a person's acquired <strong>gender </strong>entitled them to be treated as of the acquired <strong>sex. </strong>The Supreme Court determines that it does not, and that the Equality Act's references to sex discrimination apply on the basis of biological sex only. Within this context, it's important to note that a person's perceived sex, race or other protected characteristic still engages discrimination law, so if someone discriminates against a biologically male transwoman whom they perceive to be female, on the basis of perceived female sex, that is discrimination just as much as if that person were in fact biologically female.</p><p>Schedule 3 of the Equality Act provides that sex discrimination might be permitted to provide separate or single-sex services if it is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, as well as for privacy, etc. Therefore, service providers and employers can now exclude people who are, or whom they perceive to be, biologically female from male toilets and similar services. In addition, Workplace Regulations provide that employers must provide single-sex or individual private facilities, and therefore where employers do not separate these on the basis of biological sex, they are at risk of discrimination and/or harassment challenge</p><p></p><p>This is discussed here</p><p></p><p>[URL unfurl="true"]https://12kbwemploymentlaw.wordpress.com/2025/04/22/for-women-scotland-v-scottish-ministers-four-lessons-for-employers/[/URL]</p><p></p><p>A case discussed there is Earl Shilton v Miller, where Ms Miller was told to use male toilets which contained a urinal, which was less favourable treatment and hence sex discrimination.</p><p></p><p>There is thus a risk for service providers who choose not to pursue the allowed direct sex discrimination of separating services by sex but instead making them open to people based on gender identity that they will be sued by users for indirect sex discrimination. For example, a woman who uses a "single gender" toilet might claim that she feels humiliated by the presence of a biological male, and sue for compensation; the Vento bands start at £1200. Indirect discrimination (EA s 19) is allowed when it is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, but we don't know yet know whether providing mixed-sex toilets on the basis of gender identity would be that.</p><p></p><p>There is another good article here <a href="https://knowingius.org/p/sex-has-always-meant-biological-sex" target="_blank">https://knowingius.org/p/sex-has-always-meant-biological-sex</a> by Michael Foran, who was quoted in the SC judgment.</p></blockquote><p></p>
[QUOTE="trainee4u, post: 211231, member: 30779"] While I probably wouldn't bring it up in interviews unsolicited, the Supreme Court's judgment in For Women Scotland is important for employment law and also for businesses providing services such as toilets, changing rooms, etc. Here is the judgment [URL unfurl="true"]https://supremecourt.uk/uploads/uksc_2024_0042_judgment_aea6c48cee.pdf[/URL] which provides that references to sex in the Equality Act refer to biological sex. Gender recognition certificates were introduced in 2004 following the ECtHR decision in Goodwin v UK. Goodwin complained of ECHR article 8 (private life) and 12 (right to marry) violations. At the time there were neither same-sex marriages nor civil partnerships in the UK. In addition, there was no right to change birth certificates and other official documentation to reflect a gender change A gender recognition certificate has the effect of allowing one to change the sex on one's birth, death and marriage certificate. The GRA 2004 says that "for all purposes", a person's gender becomes the acquired gender. FWS were litigating whether this meant that a person's acquired [B]gender [/B]entitled them to be treated as of the acquired [B]sex. [/B]The Supreme Court determines that it does not, and that the Equality Act's references to sex discrimination apply on the basis of biological sex only. Within this context, it's important to note that a person's perceived sex, race or other protected characteristic still engages discrimination law, so if someone discriminates against a biologically male transwoman whom they perceive to be female, on the basis of perceived female sex, that is discrimination just as much as if that person were in fact biologically female. Schedule 3 of the Equality Act provides that sex discrimination might be permitted to provide separate or single-sex services if it is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, as well as for privacy, etc. Therefore, service providers and employers can now exclude people who are, or whom they perceive to be, biologically female from male toilets and similar services. In addition, Workplace Regulations provide that employers must provide single-sex or individual private facilities, and therefore where employers do not separate these on the basis of biological sex, they are at risk of discrimination and/or harassment challenge This is discussed here [URL unfurl="true"]https://12kbwemploymentlaw.wordpress.com/2025/04/22/for-women-scotland-v-scottish-ministers-four-lessons-for-employers/[/URL] A case discussed there is Earl Shilton v Miller, where Ms Miller was told to use male toilets which contained a urinal, which was less favourable treatment and hence sex discrimination. There is thus a risk for service providers who choose not to pursue the allowed direct sex discrimination of separating services by sex but instead making them open to people based on gender identity that they will be sued by users for indirect sex discrimination. For example, a woman who uses a "single gender" toilet might claim that she feels humiliated by the presence of a biological male, and sue for compensation; the Vento bands start at £1200. Indirect discrimination (EA s 19) is allowed when it is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, but we don't know yet know whether providing mixed-sex toilets on the basis of gender identity would be that. There is another good article here [URL]https://knowingius.org/p/sex-has-always-meant-biological-sex[/URL] by Michael Foran, who was quoted in the SC judgment. [/QUOTE]
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